The papers in this volume address two related questions about normative reasoning. One question concerns the components of normative evaluation. Some of the cognitive processes of normative evaluation may be independent of psychological knowledge; which obligations apply, whether an action is consistent with or violates obligations, and even, perhaps, whether punishment or praise are deserved, may not always involve reasoning about people's mental states. The other perspective on normative reasoning is that it is an aspect of psychological explanation. The causal consequences of norms are mind-dependent; they are parts of psychological causal chains. Explaining a behavior in terms of norms ("He did it because that's the rule.") at least implicitly invokes a psychological process. The main point of this commentary is that the causal structure of norms is part of the conceptual question. To evaluate a behavior or outcome in terms of norms is to frame the problem in terms of reasons and intentional action. In part this is a definitional claim: Someone who says (or thinks), "He did it because that's the rule." but does not know anything about reasons or psychological processes is not really citing an obligation. Exactly what psychological concepts are required is an interesting and open question (see Nichols, this volume). Psychologists are often somewhat dismissive of conceptual questions, regarding them as policy decisions about what counts rather than as empirical questions to drive research. In closing I would like to, briefly, offer a somewhat different perspective. Our cognitive system provides us the ability to respond to various features of our environment, including abstract, conceptual features (Fodor, 1995; Margolis, 1998; Millikan, 1998). Norms are one class of those features, and humans are able to respond to them. The basic psychological question is how we do this. What are those cognitive abilities that allow us to identify and keep track of norms, and distinguish norms from other features of the environment (Kalish, 2005; Kalish et al., 2000)? © 2006 Brill Academic Publishers.
