The Status of the Budget Constraint, Federalism and the Relative Size of Government: A Bureaucracy Approach

We develop a model along the lines of Niskanen,articulating that under a soft government budgetconstraint the full production cost of the public goodis not reflected in the tax price as perceived by theconsumer-taxpayer-voter. Various proportions ofnon-tax financing and different degrees of votermyopia with respect to discounting the future taxliabilities are taken into account. It can be shownthat both the actual level of public output and theamount of slack resources are lower under a hardbudget constraint than under a soft budget regime.Lower levels of government typically operate under ahard budget constraint when compared with the federallevel since they have only limited (public) borrowingopportunities and no access to money creation(seignorage). In a federalist setting more governmentdecisions are taken under a hard budget constraintthan in a unitary state. Hence one would expect thatthe overall size of government is relatively smallerin a structure with fiscal federalism. An empiricaltest for 19 OECD-countries (1990–1992) seems tosupport this hypothesis.