On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard

被引：0
|
作者：
Rodriguez G.E. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Economics Department, Long Island University, Brooklyn Campus, Brooklyn, NY 11201
来源：
Review of Economic Design | 2007年 / 10卷 / 4期
关键词：
Moral hazard; Principal-agent model; Value of information;
D O I：
10.1007/s10058-007-0021-8
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper shows that the marginal value of a "small amount of non-output information" is generally non-positive in the context of the standard principal-agent model involving moral hazard, which suggests a non-concavity in the value of information. However, when both the principal and the agent are risk neutral, even a small amount of non-output information may exhibit a positive incremental value in presence of a liability constraint. © Springer-Verlag 2007.
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页码：341 / 361
页数：20
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