Decoupling Economic Rights from Voting Rights: A Threat to the Traditional Corporate Governance Paradigm

被引：0
|
作者：
Klaas Vanneste
机构：
[1] Bar of Kortrijk,DLPA
[2] University of Leuven,Faculty of Law
来源：
European Business Organization Law Review | 2014年 / 15卷
关键词：
shareholder primacy; new vote buying; empty creditor; new disclosure regime for hidden owners; decoupling;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The traditional legal and economic theory of the company is based on the foundational understanding that equity ownership is a bundle of ‘cash flow rights’ and ‘voting rights’. However, this assumption is no longer adequate in today’s economic and financial reality.
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页码：59 / 81
页数：22
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