Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities

被引：0
|
作者：
Nikolai S. Kukushkin
Satoru Takahashi
Tetsuo Yamamori
机构：
[1] Dorodnicyn Computing Center,Russian Academy of Sciences
[2] Harvard University,Department of Economics
[3] University of Tokyo,Graduate School of Economics
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 2005年 / 33卷
关键词：
nash equilibrium; better response dynamics; best response dynamics; game with strategic complementarities;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In a finite game with strategic complementarities, every strategy profile is connected to a Nash equilibrium with a finite individual improvement path. If, additionally, the strategies are scalar, then every strategy profile is connected to a Nash equilibrium with a finite individual best response improvement path.
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页码：229 / 238
页数：9
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