Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities

被引：12
|
作者：
Kukushkin, NS
Takahashi, S
Yamamori, T
机构：
[1] Russian Acad Sci, Dorodnicyn Comp Ctr, Moscow 119991, Russia
[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Univ Tokyo, Grad Sch Econ, Bunkyo Ku, Tokyo 1130033, Japan
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2005年 / 33卷 / 02期
关键词：
nash equilibrium; better response dynamics; best response dynamics; game with strategic complementarities;
D O I：
10.1007/s001820400195
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In a finite game with strategic complementarities, every strategy profile is connected to a Nash equilibrium with a finite individual improvement path. If, additionally, the strategies are scalar, then every strategy profile is connected to a Nash equilibrium with a finite individual best response improvement path.
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页码：229 / 238
页数：10
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