The impact of incentives on CEO compensation and firm performance

被引:1
|
作者
Mahmoud M. Nourayi
Sudha Krishnan
机构
[1] Loyola Marymount University,Department of Accounting
关键词
CEO compensation; agency contract; incentives; performance; accounting-based incentives; market-based incentives;
D O I
10.1007/BF03029788
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
A significant component of a management control system is the incentive mechanism and motivational underpinning of compensation contracts. Most executives are rewarded in the form of cash and company stock. Our data indicate that over 82.5 percent of the observations include a bonus pay to CEOs and an even larger percentage, about 94.5 percent, have stock option grants. Our analyses indicate that the means of market-based returns are significantly larger for companies with no stock option incentives. However, the accounting-based returns do not appear to be significantly influenced by stock-based rewards. (JEL: J30, G30, L21)
引用
收藏
页码:402 / 420
页数:18
相关论文
共 50 条