Water Resources Allocation in a Transboundary River Based on a Rubinstein Bargaining Model

Transboundary water conflicts research is important to the development and progress of economic society. Water resources allocation is an effective means of solving the water conflicts. In this research, a one-to-many Rubinstein bargaining water resources allocation conceptual model (OMRBCM) is proposed to solve transboundary water conflict. In the proposed model, the quotation strategy is constructed considering the minimum survival water demand, and the discount factor is determined quantitatively based on the principles of fairness and efficiency. The OMRBCM is transformed into a one-to-one Rubinstein bargaining water resources allocation model (OORBM) by introducing the virtual opponent concept. The OMRBCM considering the principles of fairness and efficiency is compared with that only considering the fairness or efficiency principle. The rationality of the quotation strategy considering the minimum survival water demand is analyzed. The Taian section of the Dawen River Basin is selected as a case study. The results reveal that (1) the virtual opponent simplifies the calculation process of the water resources allocation scheme and reduces the number of one-to-one negotiations. (2) The discount factor based on the principles of fairness and efficiency can better balance the economic and social development levels among stakeholders; (3) The quotation strategy considering the minimum survival water demand can guarantee that the basic water demands of stakeholders are met, making the result more reasonable. The proposed model and analysis results offer decision-making support for transboundary issues that do not have political boundaries and provide a new method for obtaining reasonable water resources allocation schemes.