Contemporaneous verification of language: evidence from management earnings forecasts

被引:0
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作者
Stephen Baginski
Elizabeth Demers
Chong Wang
Julia Yu
机构
[1] University of Georgia,Terry College of Business
[2] University of Virginia,Darden Graduate School of Business
[3] Naval Postgraduate School,Nanyang Business School
[4] Nanyang Technological University,undefined
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关键词
Management forecasts; Linguistic tone; Cheap talk; Management incentives; G14; D82; M41;
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摘要
Research documents that linguistic tone is incrementally informative about stock returns. What remains a puzzle is the mechanism by which investors can assess its credibility. We examine whether contemporaneous information in management earnings forecasts serves as a timely alternative to ex post verification. We document that ex post verifiable quantitative news in unbundled forecasts, and characteristics of the linguistic tone itself, affect investors’ pricing of tone. Consistent with higher quality signals enhancing the credibility of contemporaneous lower quality signals, we find that quantitative news verifies the associated linguistic tone; when the two signals have the same sign, the price effect of tone is stronger. Furthermore, the pricing attenuation of tone is increasing in the imprecision of the quantitative forecast, suggesting that lower forecast quality compromises the quantitative signal’s credibility enhancement. Managerial incentives to inflate tone lead to the verification effect being greater for optimistic language, while management’s use of hyperbole results in attenuation of the tone’s pricing.
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页码:165 / 197
页数:32
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