The Effects of Taxes, Agency Costs and Information Asymmetry on Earnings Management: A Comparison of Public and Private Firms

被引：0
|
作者：
Anne Beatty
David G. Harris
机构：
[1] Pennsylvania State University,
[2] Syracuse University,undefined
来源：
Review of Accounting Studies | 1999年 / 4卷 / 3-4期
关键词：
Public Finance; Information Asymmetry; Earning Management; Private Firm; Agency Cost;
D O I：
10.1023/A:1009642403312
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The realization of securities gains and losses to manage earnings in publicly-traded bank holding companies has been documented in a large number of studies, but very little is known about why managers engage in this behavior. Two possible explanations for earnings management put forth by Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) are that managers engage in this behavior either to circumvent accounting-based contracts designed to mitigate agency problems, or to reduce information asymmetry.
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页码：299 / 326
页数：27
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