An axiomatization of the disjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure

被引：0
|
作者：
René Van Den Brink
机构：
[1] Free University,Department of Econometrics
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 1997年 / 26卷
关键词：
Economic Theory; Game Theory; Coalition Formation; Hierarchical Organization; Axiomatic Characterization;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Players that participate in acooperative game with transferable utilities are assumed to be part of apermission structure being a hierarchical organization in which there are players that need permission from other players before they can cooperate. Thus a permission structure limits the possibilities of coalition formation.
引用
收藏
页码：27 / 43
页数：16
相关论文
共 50 条
12345