R&D Incentives and Market Structure: Dynamic Analysis

被引：0
|
作者：
R. Cellini
L. Lambertini
机构：
[1] University of Catania,Professor of Economics, Department of Economics
[2] University of Bologna,Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Fellow, ENCORE, Department of Economics
[3] University of Amsterdam,undefined
来源：
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications | 2005年 / 126卷
关键词：
Differential games; Optimal control; Research and development.;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where firms invest in cost-reducing activities. We focus on the relationship between R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D investment increases monotonically with the number of firms. This Arrowian result contradicts the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic.
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页码：85 / 96
页数：11
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