Improved key-recovery attacks on reduced-round WEM-8

被引:0
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作者
Jun Liu
Dachao Wang
Yupu Hu
Jie Chen
Baocang Wang
机构
[1] Xidian University,State Key Laboratory of Integrated Service Networks
[2] Guilin University of Electronic Technology,Guangxi Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security
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关键词
White-box block cipher; Cryptanalysis; WEM family; Key-recovery attack; 94A60;
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摘要
Proposed in CT-RSA’2017, WEM is a family of white-box block ciphers based on the Even-Mansour structure and AES. Due to its elegant structure and impressive performance, WEM is a prominent primitive in white-box cryptography-oriented scenarios like digital rights management (DRM) and mobile payment. In this paper, we focus on the black-box key-recovery security of reduced-round WEM-8, one of the main instances in the WEM family, with the aim of gaining an intensive understanding of the security of WEM. Potential weaknesses of WEM-8 are explored, and a new approach to improving the efficiency of integral attacks is introduced, which constructs equations from the constant property, instead of the balance property. Aided by these observations, new competitive key-recovery attacks with lower time/data/memory complexity on reduced-round WEM-8 are proposed. In particular, the improved attack on 4-round WEM-8 requires only 28\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2^8$$\end{document} adaptively chosen ciphertexts, whereas the current best attack has the data complexity of 240\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2^{40}$$\end{document} chosen plaintexts. The results in this work show the effectiveness of the constant property in enhancing integral attacks and can inspire novel techniques in key-recovery attacks against other (white-box) block ciphers.
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页码:2419 / 2448
页数:29
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