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An Economic Analysis on Overbilling Incentives and Auditing Programs
被引:0
|作者:
Chris Kuo
机构:
[1] Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,
来源:
关键词:
Asymmetric information;
Auditing;
Statistical sampling;
Settlement;
D O I:
暂无
中图分类号:
学科分类号:
摘要:
An institutional auditing program typically consists of the following steps: a sample audit, the decision to move to the full audit, a settlement offer, and the full audit. Statistical sampling techniques are often used to estimate the overbilling percentage and amount. This paper discusses the optimal settlement offer, the net recovery through auditing, the condition for the auditors to move to the full audit, and how an auditing program can be truly cost-effective. This paper provides an evaluation for the statistical sampling techniques to an auditing program. The economic incentives of a contractor to overbill are also identified. Finally, it presents the key metrics and the managerial implications for auditing managers to design or enhance their auditing programs.
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页码:441 / 449
页数:8
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