Threshold models of mutual insurance

被引：0
|
作者：
V. V. Breer
D. A. Novikov
机构：
[1] Russian Academy of Sciences,Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences
来源：
Automation and Remote Control | 2015年 / 76卷
关键词：
Utility Function; Nash Equilibrium; Remote Control; Threshold Model; Insurance Fund;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Game-theoretic models of mutual insurance are considered. Here a player chooses between participating in a mutual insurance fund or not. Player’s behavior depends on its risk aversion. Using a scalar coefficient of agent’s risk aversion degree, we define utility functions leading to the threshold behavior of agents. Next, the game-theoretic models of anonymous and non-anonymous insurants are studied and Nash equilibrium conditions are established for both models.
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页码：897 / 908
页数：11
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