Modest risk-sharing significantly reduces health plans’ incentives for service distortion

被引：0
|
作者：
Shuli Brammli-Greenberg
Jacob Glazer
Ruth Waitzberg
机构：
[1] Myers-JDC Brookdale Institute and The Hebrew University,The University of Warwick and Faculty of Management
[2] Tel Aviv University,undefined
[3] Myers-JDC Brookdale Institute,undefined
[4] Ben-Gurion University,undefined
[5] Technische Universität in Berlin,undefined
来源：
The European Journal of Health Economics | 2019年 / 20卷
关键词：
Service distortion; Adverse selection; Capitation; Payment mechanisms; Risk-adjustment; Risk-sharing; Managed care; Managed competition; I13; I18;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Public payers often use payment mechanisms as a way to improve the efficiency of the healthcare system. One source of inefficiency is service distortion (SD) in which health plans over/underprovide services in order to affect the mix of their enrollees. Using Israeli data, we apply a new measure of SD to show that a mixed payment scheme, with a modest level of cost-sharing, yields a significant improvement over a pure risk-adjustment scheme. This observation implies that even though mixed systems induce overprovision of some services, their benefits far outweigh their costs.
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页码：1359 / 1374
页数：15
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