Overconfidence;
CEO compensation;
Risk taking;
Bank;
D O I:
暂无
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摘要:
Recent theory predicts that shareholders provide overconfident managers with weaker risk-taking incentives. We test this prediction using a sample of bank CEOs over the period 1993–2002. We classify a CEO as overconfident if he is more often characterized as confident than as cautious in press. Consistent with theory, we find that the sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk is lower for overconfident CEOs. Our finding suggests that shareholders know whether a CEO is overconfident, and take that into account when designing the compensation contract for the CEO.
机构:
Univ Illinois, Dept Managerial Studies, 601 S Morgan St 2210 UH, Chicago, IL 60607 USAUniv Illinois, Dept Managerial Studies, 601 S Morgan St 2210 UH, Chicago, IL 60607 USA
机构:
Univ Kentucky, Gatton Coll Business, Lexington, KY 40506 USAUniv Kentucky, Gatton Coll Business, Lexington, KY 40506 USA
Bargeron, Leonce L.
Schlingemann, Frederik P.
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机构:
Univ Pittsburgh, Katz Grad Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
Erasmus Univ, Rotterdam Sch Management, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, NetherlandsUniv Kentucky, Gatton Coll Business, Lexington, KY 40506 USA
Schlingemann, Frederik P.
Stulz, Rene M.
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机构:
Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, 2100 Neil Ave, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAUniv Kentucky, Gatton Coll Business, Lexington, KY 40506 USA
Stulz, Rene M.
Zutter, Chad J.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Pittsburgh, Katz Grad Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USAUniv Kentucky, Gatton Coll Business, Lexington, KY 40506 USA