An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Spontaneous Brain Functioning

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作者
Dario Madeo
Agostino Talarico
Alvaro Pascual-Leone
Chiara Mocenni
Emiliano Santarnecchi
机构
[1] University of Siena,
[2] Department of Information Engineering and Mathematics,undefined
[3] University of Siena,undefined
[4] Complex Systems Community,undefined
[5] Berenson-Allen Center for Non-Invasive Brain Stimulation,undefined
[6] Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center,undefined
[7] Harvard Medical School,undefined
[8] University of Siena,undefined
[9] Siena Brain Investigation & Neuromodulation Laboratory,undefined
[10] Department of Medicine,undefined
[11] Surgery and Neuroscience,undefined
[12] Neurology and Clinical Neurophysiology Section,undefined
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摘要
Our brain is a complex system of interconnected regions spontaneously organized into distinct networks. The integration of information between and within these networks is a continuous process that can be observed even when the brain is at rest, i.e. not engaged in any particular task. Moreover, such spontaneous dynamics show predictive value over individual cognitive profile and constitute a potential marker in neurological and psychiatric conditions, making its understanding of fundamental importance in modern neuroscience. Here we present a theoretical and mathematical model based on an extension of evolutionary game theory on networks (EGN), able to capture brain's interregional dynamics by balancing emulative and non-emulative attitudes among brain regions. This results in the net behavior of nodes composing resting-state networks identified using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), determining their moment-to-moment level of activation and inhibition as expressed by positive and negative shifts in BOLD fMRI signal. By spontaneously generating low-frequency oscillatory behaviors, the EGN model is able to mimic functional connectivity dynamics, approximate fMRI time series on the basis of initial subset of available data, as well as simulate the impact of network lesions and provide evidence of compensation mechanisms across networks. Results suggest evolutionary game theory on networks as a new potential framework for the understanding of human brain network dynamics.
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