A model of constitutional design and corruption

被引：0
|
作者：
Michael Mitsopoulos
Theodore Pelagidis
机构：
[1] Hellenic Federation of Enterprises,The Brookings Institution, US and Professor of Economics
[2] University of Piraeus,undefined
来源：
European Journal of Law and Economics | 2017年 / 44卷
关键词：
Constitutions; Corruption; Institutions; D02; D72; D73;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The present work proposes a theoretical framework to examine if details in the design of a consensual political system that incorporates proportional representation in the election process are necessary for it to take advantage of an inherent affinity to better accommodate the preferences of the members of a society. It is also examined if these details relate to the introduction of a satisfactory level of accountability for officials and lower levels of corruption.
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页码：67 / 90
页数：23
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