Willingness to believe and betrayal aversion: the special role of trust in art exchanges

Lack of transparency is considered a major functional deficiency of art markets. The uniqueness of artworks, the subjectivity of the pleasure component in their appeal, the unequal access to verifiable information make information asymmetries, and their potential opportunistic use, one of the dominant characteristics of this market and one that is very difficult to remedy. Yet, art goods are not simply risk-intensive goods, as are financial assets. Their complexity and specificity have given ample room, not only for calls for greater transparency and more credible information, but also for building trust-based long-term relationships. Drawing on the distinction between decisions involving risk and decisions involving trust, the paper discusses how relational trust, based on confidentiality and reciprocity, has helped compensate for the lack of transparency to increase the overall trustworthiness of art markets. Yet, trust-based exchanges have a downside too, since trust, once gained, can also be used opportunistically to defend and exploit positions of privilege and power. This form of strategic trust can become an obstacle to the diffusion of information and the adoption of credible norms of transparency.