Board Pay and the Separation of Ownership from Control in U.K. SMEs

被引：0
|
作者：
Robert Watson
Nick Wilson
机构：
[1] University of Durham,Durham Business School
[2] University of Leeds,Leeds University Business School
来源：
Small Business Economics | 2005年 / 24卷
关键词：
Empirical Result; Industrial Organization; Empirical Testing; Control Characteristic; Total Profit;
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摘要：
This paper examines Board pay for a sample of 571 U.K. SMEs from 1991 to 1995. Approximately half of the sample were closely-held (i.e., owner-managed) firms which allowed empirical testing of models of the relationship between Board pay and ownership from control characteristics. Consistent with their need to align shareholder and manager incentives, the results indicate that the change in nonclosely-held SME Board pay is significantly related to both external market pay comparisons and “benchmark” profits. This contrasts with the empirical results for the closely-held firms where Board pay awards are typically highly sensitive to current total profits but wholly unrelated to external market pay levels.
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页码：465 / 476
页数：11
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