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Income tax buyouts and income tax evasion
被引:0
|作者:
Laszlo Goerke
机构:
[1] University of Trier,Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)
[2] IZA,undefined
[3] CESifo,undefined
来源:
关键词:
Asymmetric information;
Revenues;
Self-selection ;
Tax buyouts;
Tax evasion;
D 82;
H 21;
H 24;
H 26;
D O I:
暂无
中图分类号:
学科分类号:
摘要:
A tax buyout is a contract between tax authorities and a tax payer which reduces the marginal income tax rate in exchange for a lump-sum payment. While previous contributions have focussed on labour supply, we consider the interaction with tax evasion and show that a buyout can increase expected tax revenues. This will be the case if (1) the audit probability is constant and the penalty for evasion is a function of undeclared income or (2) the penalty depends on the amount of taxes evaded, and authorities use information about income generated by the decision about a tax buyout offer when setting audit probabilities. Since individuals will only utilise a tax buyout if they are better off, higher tax revenues imply that such contracts can be Pareto improving.
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页码:120 / 143
页数:23
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