机构:
Univ Trier, Inst Labour Law & Ind Relat European Union IAAEU, D-54286 Trier, Germany
IZA, Bonn, Germany
CESifo, Munich, GermanyUniv Trier, Inst Labour Law & Ind Relat European Union IAAEU, D-54286 Trier, Germany
Goerke, Laszlo
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机构:
[1] Univ Trier, Inst Labour Law & Ind Relat European Union IAAEU, D-54286 Trier, Germany
A tax buyout is a contract between tax authorities and a tax payer which reduces the marginal income tax rate in exchange for a lump-sum payment. While previous contributions have focussed on labour supply, we consider the interaction with tax evasion and show that a buyout can increase expected tax revenues. This will be the case if (1) the audit probability is constant and the penalty for evasion is a function of undeclared income or (2) the penalty depends on the amount of taxes evaded, and authorities use information about income generated by the decision about a tax buyout offer when setting audit probabilities. Since individuals will only utilise a tax buyout if they are better off, higher tax revenues imply that such contracts can be Pareto improving.
机构:
Univ Modena & Reggio Emilia, Capp Dipartimento Econ Polit, Via Berengario 51, I-41121 Modena, ItalyUniv Modena & Reggio Emilia, Capp Dipartimento Econ Polit, Via Berengario 51, I-41121 Modena, Italy
Baldini, Massimo
Bosi, Paolo
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机构:
Univ Modena & Reggio Emilia, Capp Dipartimento Econ Polit, Via Berengario 51, I-41121 Modena, ItalyUniv Modena & Reggio Emilia, Capp Dipartimento Econ Polit, Via Berengario 51, I-41121 Modena, Italy
Bosi, Paolo
Lalla, Michele
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机构:
Univ Modena & Reggio Emilia, Capp Dipartimento Econ Polit, Via Berengario 51, I-41121 Modena, ItalyUniv Modena & Reggio Emilia, Capp Dipartimento Econ Polit, Via Berengario 51, I-41121 Modena, Italy