Bargaining with Incomplete information an axiomatic approach

被引：0
|
作者：
Joachim Rosenmüller
机构：
[1] Institute of Mathematical Economics University of Bielefeld,
来源：
Theory and Decision | 1997年 / 42卷
关键词：
Specific Class; Incomplete Information; Natural Generalization; Bargaining Solution; Axiomatic Approach;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Within this paper we consider a model of Nash bargaining with incomplete information. In particular, we focus on fee games, which are a natural generalization of side payment games in the context of incomplete information. For a specific class of fee games we provide two axiomatic approaches in order to establish the Expected Contract Value, which is a version of the Nash bargaining solution.
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页码：105 / 146
页数：41
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