Contracts, Individual Revenue and Performance

被引:0
|
作者
Peter Chinloy
Daniel T. Winkler
机构
[1] Kogod School of Business,Joseph M. Bryan School of Business and Economics
[2] American University,undefined
[3] University of North Carolina at Greensboro,undefined
来源
Journal of Labor Research | 2012年 / 33卷
关键词
Debt contracts; Effort; Productivity; D81; J23; M13;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In some jobs individual workers have control over revenue, effort and productivity. These jobs include professional firms for law, medicine and consulting. They include personal services in areas from hair styling to taxi driving. The firm offers contracts that allow for a sharing of risks and rewards. These incentives include a split of output between the firm and worker and employee ownership. For U.S. real estate agents, a choice is available between splitting revenue with the firm or retaining 100 % above a fixed prepaid minimum. These are equity and sequential debt contracts. Under the sequential debt contract, effort increases but output per hour declines. Separately, agents increase effort and productivity if offered ownership in the firm, effectively a claim on others’ performance.
引用
收藏
页码:545 / 562
页数:17
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