Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders

被引：0
|
作者：
T. Andersson
C. Andersson
A. J. J. Talman
机构：
[1] Lund University,Department of Economics
[2] Tilburg University,CentER, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research
来源：
Annals of Operations Research | 2013年 / 211卷
关键词：
Multi-item auctions; Unit-demand; Excess demand; Algorithms;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called “sets in excess demand” is introduced, and the main result demonstrates that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family.
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页码：27 / 36
页数：9
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