Social Utility in Ultimatum Bargaining

被引:3
|
作者
Michel J. J. Handgraaf
Eric Van Dijk
David De Cremer
机构
[1] Tilburg University,Department of Economic and Social Psychology
[2] Leiden University,Department of Social and Organizational Psychology
[3] University of Maastricht,Department of Experimental Psychology
关键词
ultimatum game; social utility; fairness; equity; self-interest;
D O I
10.1023/A:1025940829543
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In this article we will provide an overview of factors that influence the weight that self-interest and equity related motives receive in ultimatum bargaining. These factors are grouped into three main categories: factors relating to the context of the game, factors relating to the parties involved, and factors related to characteristics of the game. Results of the studies are discussed in relation to the concept of social utility. The authors point out possible omissions in the literature—especially the lack of interest for the behavior of recipients—and recommend directions for future research.
引用
收藏
页码:263 / 283
页数:20
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