Collaborative shipping under different cost-sharing agreements

被引:46
|
作者
Tinoco, Silvia Valeria Padilla [1 ]
Creemers, Stefan [1 ,2 ]
Boute, Robert N. [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Res Ctr Operat Management, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium
[2] LEM CNRS 9221, IESEG Sch Management, F-59000 Lille, France
[3] Vlerick Business Sch, Technol & Operat Management Area, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium
关键词
Supply chain management; Horizontal collaboration; Joint replenishment; Can-order policy; Gain sharing; JOINT REPLENISHMENT PROBLEM; HORIZONTAL COOPERATION; INVENTORY MODELS; ALLOCATION; GAME; LOGISTICS; POLICIES; SYSTEM;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.013
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We study collaborative shipping where two shippers bundle their shipments to share the same transportation vehicle (also known as co-loading). The goal of such a collaboration is to reduce the total number of transports, thereby reducing transportation costs and CO2 emissions. To synchronize the replenishment of both companies, we adopt a can-order joint replenishment policy for both companies, and we analyze how the costs of each individual company are impacted by the collaboration. We consider different agreements to redistribute the costs (or the gains) of the collaboration, ranging from no cost redistribution at all, sharing the transportation costs (or its gains) only, to sharing the total logistics costs (or its gains) that are impacted by the collaboration, i.e., transportation + inventory costs. We show that the stability (and thus the long-term viability) of the partnership strongly depends on the cost-sharing agreement, in combination with the allocation mechanism used to share the costs (or gains) of the coordination. Although most companies focus on the redistribution of transportation costs, we show that this might not lead to a stable situation where each individual company eventually benefits from collaboration. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:827 / 837
页数:11
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