Risk taking in competition: Evidence from match play golf tournaments

被引:13
|
作者
Ozbeklik, Serkan [1 ]
Smith, Janet Kiholm [2 ]
机构
[1] Claremont Mckenna Coll, Robert Day Sch Econ & Finance, Claremont, CA 91711 USA
[2] Claremont Mckenna Coll, Robert Day Sch Econ & Finance, Von Tobel Prof Econ, Claremont, CA 91711 USA
关键词
Tournament incentives; Risk taking; Peer effects; INCENTIVES; FIRMS; CONTESTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.05.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We test hypotheses regarding risk taking behavior of competitors in settings characterized by one-on-one, single elimination tournaments. We draw data from 579 professional golf matches and over 18,000 holes from 2003 to 2013 in tournaments where match-play scoring is used rather than stroke-play. Because of the uniqueness of the data, we are able to provide clean empirical tests of how risk taking is affected by horizon effects (holes remaining), peer effects arising from heterogeneity in player abilities, match status (whether behind or ahead), and the difficulty of the task/project (hole). The findings are applicable to corporate settings where only a few rivals compete for a prize, such as a winning bid, a promotion, market share dominance, and patents. Other applications include litigation contests and political elections. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:506 / 523
页数:18
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