Why regulate private firm disclosure and auditing?

被引:102
|
作者
Minnis, Michael [1 ]
Shroff, Nemit [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[2] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
audit; disclosure; private firm; regulation; externalities; PRODUCT MARKET PREDATION; INVESTMENT DECISIONS; ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT; SECURITIES-REGULATION; MANDATORY DISCLOSURE; REPORTING REGULATION; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; AGENCY PROBLEMS;
D O I
10.1080/00014788.2017.1303962
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Private firms face differing financial disclosure and auditing regulations around the world. In the US and Canada, for example, private firms are generally neither required to disclose their financial results nor have their financial statements audited. By contrast, many firms with limited liability in most other countries are required to file at least some financial information publicly and are also required to have their financial statements audited. This paper discusses and analyzes the reasons for differential financial reporting regulation of private firms. We first discuss various definitions of a private firm. Next, we examine theoretical arguments for regulating the financial reporting of these firms, particularly related to public disclosure and auditing. We then provide new survey-based evidence of firms' and standard setters' views of regulation. We conclude by identifying future research opportunities.
引用
收藏
页码:473 / 502
页数:30
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