Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

被引：9
|
作者：
Gossner, O
Vieille, N
机构：
[1] Univ Paris 10, THEMA, F-92001 Nanterre, France
[2] Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium
[3] Ecole Polytech & HEC, Dept Finance & Econ, F-78351 Jouy En Josas, France
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2003年 / 42卷 / 01期
关键词：
public value of information; games with incomplete information; bandit problems;
D O I：
10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：25 / 47
页数：23
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