The signaling role of covenants and the speed of capital structure adjustment under poor creditor rights: Evidence from domestically and cross-listed firms in Brazil

被引:0
|
作者
Albanez, Tatiana [1 ]
Schiozer, Rafael [2 ]
机构
[1] Sch Econ Business & Accounting FEA USP, Sao Paulo, Brazil
[2] Sao Paulo Sch Business Adm FGV EAESP, Sao Paulo, Brazil
基金
巴西圣保罗研究基金会;
关键词
Optimal capital structure; Creditor rights; Cross-listing; Institutional environment; Speed of adjustment; Adjustment costs; Waivers; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT; DEBT; DETERMINANTS; LEVERAGE; COST; RISK;
D O I
10.1016/j.mulfin.2021.100704
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper studies how covenants affect the speed of capital structure adjustment in Brazil, an environment with poor creditor rights. Unlike previous evidence for developed countries, we find that the existence of debt covenants increases the speed of capital structure adjustment by more than 20% for firms that are only domestically listed. For firms that are cross-listed in the US, this effect is smaller (if any), possibly because these firms "bond" to the stricter regulation and creditor protection of the US market. Our results suggest that in emerging markets with poor creditor protection, covenants are an imperfect substitute for strong creditor rights and employed as a signaling device, permitting firms to adjust their leverage towards optimal levels quicker.
引用
收藏
页数:16
相关论文
共 17 条