Information, incentives, and effects of risk-sharing on the real economy

被引:11
|
作者
Liu, Mark [1 ]
Wu, Wenfeng [2 ]
Yu, Tong [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Kentucky, Gatton Coll Business & Econ, Lexington, KY 40506 USA
[2] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Cincinnati, Carl H Lindner Coll Business, Cincinnati, OH 45221 USA
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
CAPITAL STRUCTURE POLICY; PRESIDENTIAL-ADDRESS; CORPORATE-INVESTMENT; PORTFOLIO CHOICE; MANAGEMENT; PRICE; QUALITY; DEBT;
D O I
10.1016/j.pacfin.2018.12.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In the absence of market imperfections, the mutuality principle leads to efficient risk sharing and the Pareto optimal asset allocations. With market imperfections such as transaction costs and information asymmetry, risk-sharing becomes costly, and it can even lead to financial crises. We emphasize the impact of risk-sharing on the real economy, especially the incentives for the insured party to take on excessive risks because the downsides are borne by the insurer or the ultimate risk taker. We review selective literature and summarize papers included in this issue, grouping them into three broad categories: risk identification, risk measurement, and risk management techniques. We conclude by outlining several streams of future research, including mechanisms to monitor excessive risk-taking, how to mitigate risk interconnectedness, and the potential applications of Fintech in risk sharing.
引用
收藏
页数:9
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