Servicers and Mortgage-Backed Securities Default: Theory and Evidence

被引:20
|
作者
Ambrose, Brent W. [1 ]
Sanders, Anthony B. [2 ]
Yavas, Abdullah [3 ]
机构
[1] Penn State Univ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
[2] George Mason Univ, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
[3] Univ Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1540-6229.12099
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We study conflicting incentives of the master and special servicers in handling troubled loans in a Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities deal and how the frictions between the interests of the two servicers might be diminished if the master and special servicing rights are held by the same firm. We show that concentrating both servicing rights in one firm reduces the likelihood that a defaulted loan terminates in foreclosure.
引用
收藏
页码:462 / 489
页数:28
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