Reputation Building as a Strategy for Terror Group Survival

In this paper I investigate terror groups' survival. The fate of terrorists hinges heavily on the power the terror group derives from its reputation. The reputation, which depends on policies and actions the group takes within their constituency, determines the degree to which each group can find recruits, resourres, and support for its cause. I contend that terror groups investing on positive or negative reputation within their constituency- the people they claim to represent==are likely to survive longer. Yet, I argue, building a positive reputation has a greater impact on a group's staying power given that this attracts loyal and committed supporters. Conversely; groups with no clearly defined reputation-building policies undergo an organizational change. I find support for my expectations by testing my arguments over all domestic terror groups active between 1980 and 2011 using the RTG and GTD databases. The findings reveal that once a terrorist group is formed, it is exceedingly difficult to obliterate it so long as it follows a clear reputational strategy to achieve their goals.