Relationship lending and bank loan covenant violations

被引：2
|
作者：
Bo, Xu Chong [1 ]
Li, Wenyi [2 ]
Shi, Jing [3 ,4 ]
Zheng, Yi [4 ]
Zhou, Qing [4 ]
机构：
[1] Jiangxi Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Finance & Publ Adm, Nanchang, Jiangxi, Peoples R China
[2] Cent China Normal Univ, Sch Econ & Business Adm, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[3] Shandong Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Jinan, Peoples R China
[4] Macquarie Univ, Dept Appl Finance, Sydney, NSW, Australia
来源：
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE | 2021年 / 61卷 / 04期
关键词：
Relationship lending; Loan covenant violations; Information asymmetry;
D O I：
10.1111/acfi.12778
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We examine the association between relationship lending and the likelihood of bank loan covenant violations. We find that relationship lending reduces the probability of ex-post covenant violations. The length of the lending relationships has an inverted U-shaped effect on the likelihood of covenant violations. The borrowers and lenders both benefit from relationship lending, but long-term lending relationships weaken the borrower's bargaining power.
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页码：5847 / 5878
页数：32
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