Corruption and cheating: Evidence from rural Thailand

被引:3
|
作者
Hubler, Olaf [1 ]
Koch, Melanie [2 ,3 ]
Menkhoff, Lukas [2 ,3 ]
Schmidt, Ulrich [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Leibniz Univ Hannover, Konigsworther Pl 1, D-30167 Hannover, Germany
[2] Humboldt Univ, D-10108 Berlin, Germany
[3] German Inst Econ Res DIW Berlin, D-10108 Berlin, Germany
[4] Univ Johannesburg, Kiel Inst World Econ, Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel, Germany
[5] Univ Kiel, Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel, Germany
关键词
Corruption; Cheating; Individual characteristics; Lab-in-the-field experiment; INCENTIVES; AVERSION;
D O I
10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105526
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This study tests the prediction that perceived corruption reduces ethical behavior. Integrating a standard "cheating" experiment into a broad household survey in rural Thailand, we find tentative support for this prediction: respondents who perceive corruption in state affairs are more likely to cheat and, thus, to fortify the negative consequences of corruption. Interestingly, there is a small group of non-conformers. The main relation is robust to consideration of socio-demographic, attitudinal, and situational control variables. Attendance of others at the cheating experiment, stimulating the reputational concern to be seen as honest, reduces cheating, thus indicating transparency as a remedy. (c) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页数:15
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