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Proximity and litigation: Evidence from the geographic location of institutional investors
被引:10
|作者:
Mazur, Mieszko
[1
]
Salganik-Shoshan, Galla
[2
]
Walker, Thomas
[3
]
Wang, Jun
[4
]
机构:
[1] LEM CNRS, IESEG Sch Management, 3Rue Digue, F-59000 Lille, France
[2] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, IL-8410501 Beer Sheva, Israel
[3] Concordia Univ, John Molson Sch Business, 1450 Guy St, Montreal, PQ H3H 0A1, Canada
[4] Univ Western Ontario, DAN Dept Management & Org Studies, London, ON N6A 5C2, Canada
关键词:
Litigation;
Institutional investors;
Geography;
Monitoring;
Corporate governance;
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
TRADE-OFF;
OWNERSHIP;
RISK;
INVESTMENT;
LAWSUITS;
MARKET;
ACTIVISM;
BLOCKHOLDERS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.finmar.2018.05.002
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
In this paper, we examine how the geographic distance between a firm and its largest institutional investors affects the firm's litigation risk. We show that geographic proximity between the firm and its largest institutional shareholders reduces the incidence of a lawsuit. Moreover, we find that geographic proximity affects the relationship between institutional investors' ownership and the litigation risk of their portfolio firms. These findings indicate that geographically proximate investors may have an informational advantage over investors who are located far away, and that this advantage manifests itself in more effective monitoring of firm management, and consequently, in lower litigation risk. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:60 / 74
页数:15
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