Application of Cooperation Game Theory in Reactive Power Market of Hydraulic-Power Plant

被引:2
|
作者
Lin, Liling [1 ]
Huang, Chaorong [2 ]
Zhao, Linfeng [3 ]
机构
[1] China Univ Polit Sci & Law, Business Sch, Beijing 100088, Peoples R China
[2] State Grid Co Ltd, Maintenance Branch Co, Xiamen 361004, Fujian, Peoples R China
[3] Boston Univ, Phys Dept, Sch Arts & Sci, Boston, MA 02215 USA
关键词
Reactive power market; cooperation game theory; price; nash equilibrium; hydraulic-power plant;
D O I
10.2112/SI93-077.1
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
According to the regional characteristics of reactive power market, based on cooperation games theory, the paper constructed reactive power cooperation game model of power factory. Shapley method was adopted to solve the cooperation games model. Example was used to analyze the profit assignment of the power factory in view of different conditions, including full-coalition, non-coalition and partly-coalition. The application of the examples can explain that Nash equilibrium exists in the quotation strategy of the power factory and the suppliers may conspire to control the price. Under the auction mechanism of the market clearance price, the power factory has the motion of pursuit for the high price. The market force of power factory is obvious especially in the peak of power demand.
引用
收藏
页码:578 / 581
页数:4
相关论文
共 50 条