Debt maturity without commitment

被引:17
|
作者
Niepelt, Dirk [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Study Ctr Gerzensee, CH-3115 Gerzensee, Switzerland
[2] Univ Bern, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland
[3] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London SW1Y 6LA, England
[4] CESifo, Munich, Germany
关键词
Debt Maturity structure; No commitment; Default; GOVERNMENT DEBT; EMERGING ECONOMIES; DEFAULT RISK; PUBLIC DEBT; BONDS; CRISES; POLICY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.08.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
How does sovereign risk shape the maturity structure of public debt? We consider a government that balances benefits of default, due to tax savings, and costs, due to output losses. Debt issuance affects subsequent default and rollover decisions and thus, current debt prices. This induces welfare costs beyond the consumption smoothing benefits from the marginal unit of debt. The equilibrium maturity structure minimises these welfare costs. It is interior with positive gross positions and shortens during times of crisis and low output, consistent with empirical evidence. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:S37 / S54
页数:18
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