Debt Maturity structure;
No commitment;
Default;
GOVERNMENT DEBT;
EMERGING ECONOMIES;
DEFAULT RISK;
PUBLIC DEBT;
BONDS;
CRISES;
POLICY;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.08.006
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
How does sovereign risk shape the maturity structure of public debt? We consider a government that balances benefits of default, due to tax savings, and costs, due to output losses. Debt issuance affects subsequent default and rollover decisions and thus, current debt prices. This induces welfare costs beyond the consumption smoothing benefits from the marginal unit of debt. The equilibrium maturity structure minimises these welfare costs. It is interior with positive gross positions and shortens during times of crisis and low output, consistent with empirical evidence. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAUniv Chicago, Booth Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
He, Zhiguo
Milbradt, Konstantin
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Northwestern Univ, Kellogg Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USAUniv Chicago, Booth Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
机构:
City Univ London, Cass Business Sch, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ, EnglandCity Univ London, Cass Business Sch, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ, England
Bruche, Max
Segura, Anatoli
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Banca Italia, Via Nazl 91, I-00184 Rome, ItalyCity Univ London, Cass Business Sch, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ, England