Call options with concave payoffs: An application to executive stock options

被引:1
|
作者
Bae, Kwangil [1 ]
Kang, Jangkoo [2 ]
Kim, Hwa-Sung [3 ]
机构
[1] Chonnam Natl Univ, Coll Business Adm, Gwangju, South Korea
[2] Korea Adv Inst Sci & Technol, Coll Business, Seoul, South Korea
[3] Kyung Hee Univ, Sch Management, Seoul, South Korea
基金
新加坡国家研究基金会;
关键词
bull spread; concave payoff; executive value; incentive effect; log option; power option; COMPENSATION; VALUATION; EXERCISE; PRICES;
D O I
10.1002/fut.21924
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We observe that the incentive effects of traditional stock options can be improved by making the option's payoff concave in the region of a high stock price at maturity. To reflect the concave property, we propose two types of executive stock options: a generalized power option and an ordinary bull spread. Under the [Hall and Murphy (): American Economic Review 209-214, Hall and Murphy () Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 3-42] framework, we show that the generalized power option with high concavity and the ordinary bull spread generate greater incentive effects than those of traditional options or the [Bernard, Boyle, and Chen (): The Journal of Derivatives 23: 9-20] power executive options.
引用
收藏
页码:943 / 957
页数:15
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