Strong reciprocity and human sociality

被引:651
作者
Gintis, H [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Massachusetts, Dept Econ, Amherst, MA 01003 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jtbi.2000.2111
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Human groups maintain a high level of sociality despite a low level of relatedness among group members. This paper reviews the evidence for an empirically identifiable form of prosocial behavior in humans, which we call "strong reciprocity", that may in part explain human sociality. A strong reciprocator is predisposed to cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators, even when this behavior cannot be justified in terms of extended kinship or reciprocal altruism. We present a simple model, stylized but plausible, of the evolutionary emergence of strong reciprocity. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:169 / 179
页数:11
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