Innovation and risk selection in deregulated social health insurance

被引:21
|
作者
Lehmann, H [1 ]
Zweifel, P [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Zurich, Socioecon Inst, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
health insurance; asymmetric information; innovation;
D O I
10.1016/j.jhealeco.2003.12.007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
One important motive for deregulating social health insurance is to encourage product innovation. For the first time, the cost savings achieved by non-US managed care plans that are attributable to product innovation are estimated, using a novel approach. Panel data from a major Swiss health insurer permits to infer health status, which can be used to predict health care expenditure. The econometric evidence suggests that the managed care plans benefit from risk selection effects. In the case of the health maintenance organization (HMO) plan, however, the pure innovation effect may account for as much as two-thirds of the cost advantage. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:997 / 1012
页数:16
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