Two kinds of explanatory integration in cognitive science

Some philosophers argue that we should eschew cross-explanatory integrations of mechanistic, dynamicist, and psychological explanations in cognitive science, because, unlike integrations of mechanistic explanations, they do not deliver genuine, cognitive scientific explanations (cf. Kaplan and Craver in Philos Sci 78:601-627, 2011; Milkowski in Stud Log 48:13-33, 2016; Piccinini and Craver in Synthese 183:283-311, 2011). Here I challenge this claim by comparing the theoretical virtues of both kinds of explanatory integrations. I first identify two theoretical virtues of integrations of mechanistic explanations-unification and greater qualitative parsimony-and argue that no cross-explanatory integration could have such virtues. However, I go on to argue that this is only a problem for those who think that cognitive science aims to specify one fundamental structure responsible for cognition. For those who do not, cross-explanatory integration will have at least two theoretical virtues to a greater extent than integrations of mechanistic explanations: explanatory depth and applicability. I conclude that one's views about explanatory integration in cognitive science cannot be segregated from one's views about the explanatory task of cognitive science.