Environmental decentralization and political centralization

被引:69
|
作者
Fredriksson, Per G. [1 ]
Wollscheid, Jim R. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Louisville, Dept Econ, Louisville, KY 40292 USA
[2] Univ Arkansas, Dept Econ, Ft Smith, AR 72913 USA
关键词
Environmental regulations; Policy; Spillovers; Environmental federalism; Decentralization; Political institutions; INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION; REGULATORY COMPETITION; PROPENSITY SCORE; FEDERALISM; QUALITY; SPILLOVERS; GOVERNANCE; EFFICIENCY; PARTIES; ECONOMY;
D O I
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.09.019
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
In this paper, we investigate how political institutions affect policy outcomes. In particular, does the level of political centralization affect the outcome of environmental decentralization? We use a cross section of up to 110 countries and a propensity score estimation approach. We find that political centralization, measured by the strength of national level political parties, increases the stringency of environmental policies set under decentralized regimes. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:402 / 410
页数:9
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