Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt

被引:28
|
作者
Colonnello, Stefano [1 ,2 ]
Curatola, Giuliano [3 ,4 ]
Ngoc Giang Hoang [5 ]
机构
[1] Otto von Guericke Univ, Magdeburg, Germany
[2] Halle Inst Econ Res IWH, Halle, Germany
[3] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany
[4] Res Ctr SAFE, Frankfurt, Germany
[5] Univ Utrecht, Sch Econ, Utrecht, Netherlands
关键词
Inside debt; Credit spreads; Risk-taking; CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS; MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; AGENCY COSTS; CEOS; PAY; INVESTMENT; POLICIES; MODELS; FIRM;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.05.012
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We develop a model of compensation structure and asset risk choice, where a risk-averse manager is compensated with salary, equity and inside debt. We seek to understand the joint implications of this compensation package for managerial risk-taking incentives and credit spreads. We show that the size and seniority of inside debt not only are crucial for the relation between inside debt and credit spreads but also play an important role in shaping the relation between equity compensation and credit spreads. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with traded credit default swap contracts, we provide evidence supportive of the model's predictions. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:428 / 466
页数:39
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