Primary auction of slots at European airports

被引：9
|
作者：
Pertuiset, Thomas [1 ]
Santos, Georgina [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Oxford, Transport Studies Unit, Oxford OX1 3QY, England
[2] Cardiff Univ, Sch Planning & Geog, Cardiff CF10 3WA, S Glam, Wales
来源：
RESEARCH IN TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS | 2014年 / 45卷
基金：
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词：
Airport congestion; Slot trading; Auctions; Vickrey auction; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction; Grandfather rights; Slot coordination; CONGESTION; EFFICIENT;
D O I：
10.1016/j.retrec.2014.07.009
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We use the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction mechanism to propose a system of primary auctions of slots at congested European airports. The system would ensure allocative efficiency and would be incentive-compatible, flexible, understandable, implementable and transparent. Only 10% of slots would be auctioned per year. The current slot coordination mechanism used in Europe, based on historic use of slots, would thus be phased out and disappear within a decade. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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页码：66 / 71
页数：6
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