When unionisation is profitable for firms in network industries

被引：2
|
作者：
Fanti, Luciano [1 ]
Buccella, Domenico [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Pisa, Dept Econ & Management, Pisa, Italy
[2] Kozminski Univ, Dept Econ, Jagiellonska St 57-59, PL-03301 Warsaw, Poland
来源：
METROECONOMICA | 2019年 / 70卷 / 04期
关键词：
competitive labour market; efficient bargaining; unionised oligopoly; TRADE-UNIONS; EMPLOYMENT; MODELS; WAGES; COMPETITION; EFFICIENCY; DELEGATION; AGENDA; ENTRY; PRICE;
D O I：
10.1111/meca.12249
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In an industry characterised by the presence of network effects, this paper investigates a duopolistic game in which firms may choose whether to bargain over wages and employment with unions or to face a competitive labour market (i.e., without unions). If unions are sufficiently wage-sensitive, it is shown that the presence of sufficiently large network effects makes unionisation the Pareto efficient sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for firms.
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页码：711 / 722
页数：12
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