A design of managerial compensation contract on agency theory

被引：0
|
作者：
Han, DP [1 ]
Ye, YX [1 ]
Li, XC [1 ]
机构：
[1] Harbin Inst Technol, Sch Management, Harbin 150001, Peoples R China
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF 2002 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE & ENGINEERING, VOLS I AND II | 2002年
关键词：
principal-agency; managerial compensation contract; noises;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Managerial compensation contract is a kind of appointment, which is designed for the right, responsibility and profit between agents and the principals. But from the materials received abroad and home, the theory research of the problem is relatively scattered and short of integration and analytical study. This paper firstly makes clear the design guiding ideology of managerial compensation contract, then designs a contract on symmetric and asymmetric information conditions by math's reasoning patterns, at last discuss the determinacy of Managerial compensations' base and the methods of excluding noise.
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页码：2379 / 2383
页数：5
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